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Property Law. Pollack v. 217 Indian Avenue, L.L.C., 222 A.3d 478
(2019). A Rhode Island court will not grant specific performance to
implement a restrictive land covenant, even when the covenant is
violated, if such injunctive relief would be futile. Although the
Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed its earlier decisions granting
seemingly harsh injunctive relief in order to enforce property
serivitudes, the Court will not grant injunctive relief when such
relief would result in no benefit to the plaintiff and force the
defendant to demolish a house only to rebuild it.
FACTS AND TRAVEL

In the winter of 2017, the defendants, Jane and James Moore,
knocked down their one-story, oceanfront home in Portsmouth,
Rhode Island, and began constructing a new three-story structure
without gaining approval from their subdivision’s committee.1 The
Moore’s property was part of a 1960 subdivision plan that included
a restrictive land covenant.2 The covenant provided that “[n]o
building or buildings should be erected, placed or altered on any lot
until construction plans and specifications, and the plans showing
the location of the structure have been approved in writing by a
committee” in order to ensure “quality of workmanship and
materials” and to protect the “harmony of external design with
existing structures.”3
The subdivision’s committee was composed of the nine
subdivision property owners, and a simple majority was sufficient
to approve new construction plans.4 However, the defendants did
not seek committee approval prior to commencing construction, so
the plaintiff, Bruce Pollack, notified the defendants of their
violation and demanded they cease and desist construction.5 When
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Pollack v. 217 Indian Ave., L.L.C., 222 A.3d 478, 480 (R.I. 2019).
Id. at 480.
Id. at 480, 483.
Id. at 480.
Id.
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the defendants failed to stop, the plaintiffs filed suit against Jane
and James Moore and their real estate L.L.C. in Newport County
Superior Court seeking a temporary restraining order and a
preliminary injunction to stop construction.6 The plaintiffs also
sought damages for the defendant’s violation of the covenant of
quiet enjoyment.7
In June, the defendants gained retroactive approval of their
construction plans with a committee vote of 8–1 and consequently
moved for summary judgment.8 The plaintiff filed a cross-motion
for summary judgment arguing that the restrictive covenant
requires prior approval and urging the court to recognize the
Restatement Third of Property: Servitudes § 6.10, which states that
a committee does not have the power to amend a restrictive
covenant without the approval of the adversely affected property
holder when the amendment does not apply uniformly.9 In a bench
trial, the Superior Court granted the defendant’s motion for
summary judgment, holding that the restrictive covenant did not
require prior approval but rather was flexible enough to allow
committee approval at any point up to the completion of
construction.10 The defendants appealed to the Rhode Island
Supreme Court, and the Court returned the case to the regular
calendar for full argument after determining that the plaintiff had
shown cause that the case should not be summarily dismissed.11

6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 480–481.
9. Id. at 480 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 6.10
(AM. LAW INST. 2000)). The plaintiffs also urged the Court to recognize § 6.13
of the Third Restatement Property: Servitudes, which states that the committee owes subdivision members a duty of good faith and fair dealing. Id. at 481
(citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 6.13). Thus, the plaintiff
argued that he should have been given notice and the opportunity to object to
the construction, but because he did not name the committee members as defendants, the Court treated the issue as waived. Id. 481 n.4.
10. Pollack, 222 A.3d at 480–81. The defendants also filed a motion to
dismiss themselves as defendants in their personal capacities that the hearing
judge ruled was moot when he granted their motion for summary judgment.
Id.
11. Id. at 481.
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ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

On review, the Court sought to resolve two issues: whether
the land covenant created an express or implied right to gain
approval for construction plans and design specifications
retroactively, and, if the covenant did not create such a right,
whether equitable relief was appropriate.12 Recognizing that
restrictive land covenants should be interpreted both by giving
words their “plain and ordinary meaning” and by balancing the
competing objectives of maintaining the free alienability of land
and respecting the purposes for which the restriction was
established, the Court determined that the language of the
covenant required approval prior to commencing construction.13
Thus, the Court disagreed with the hearing justice who had
concluded that the covenant allowed approval in the middle of
construction; however, the Court affirmed the ruling of the trial
court after determining that equitable relief was not appropriate in
this case.14
The Court declined to grant equitable relief because such
relief would be futile.15 The Court noted that a court of equity may
refuse to grant specific performance when the result would provide
the plaintiff with no benefit, yet impose substantial inconvenience
and expense on the defendant.16 In order to enforce the land
covenant, the Court would have to order the demolition of a house
that the defendants could simply rebuild because they have since
gained the committee’s approval for their construction plans.17 The
plaintiff would gain no relief because the structure he seeks to
demolish can be rebuilt, and the defendants would face substantial
costs and inconvenience to demolish the home they have already
built, only to rebuild another identical house in its place.18 As such,
12. Id. at 480, 482 n.6. Although the plaintiff included a plea for damages
in his complaint and reasserted the plea at oral arguments, the Court did not
consider his claim for damages because he cited no law or claim of error in his
briefings that would entitle him to such relief. Id. at 482 n.6.
13. Id. at 483 (quoting Gregory v. State Dep’t of Mental Health, 495 A.2d
997, 1001 (R.I. 1985)).
14. Id. at 482–83.
15. Id. at 484.
16. Id. at 483.
17. Id.
18. Id.

2021]

SURVEY SECTION

959

the Court decided to exercise its discretion and denied specific
performance.19
The Court proceeded to distinguish the case from Cullen v.
Tarini20 and Rose Nulman Park Foundation v. Four Twenty
Corporation21: two cases in which the Court ordered harsh
equitable relief in order to enforce property servitudes.22 The Court
noted that, in Cullen and Nulman, equitable relief was harsh, but
not futile.23 The Cullen remedy was not futile because the
restrictive covenant detailed specific building requirements.24
Thus, when the Cullen Court ordered the defendants to renovate
and bring their house in compliance with the covenant, the
defendants could not simply revert to their old specifications by
getting the old design approved like the defendants here.25 The
Court also noted that the purpose of the Cullen covenant was
fulfilled by ordering equitable relief because the covenant was
created to preserve the plaintiff’s view, whereas the covenant here
was created to ensure quality materials and aesthetics.26 Thus, the
purpose of the covenant here was fulfilled by the committee’s
retroactive approval of the design plans even though the defendants
failed to obtain approval and begin construction in the correct
order.27 Similarly, the Court’s order in Nulman to remove a $1.8
million house that was encroaching on the neighboring property
was harsh but not futile because once the encroachment was
removed, the land boundaries were once again respected.28
As such, the Court granted the defendant’s motion for
summary judgment because the requested relief would not merely
be harsh but also futile. Since the homeowners ultimately obtained

19. Id.
20. Cullen v. Tarini, 15 A.3d 968, 983 (R.I. 2011).
21. Rose Nulman Park Found. v. Four Twenty Corp., 93 A.3d 25, 33 (R.I.
2014).
22. Pollack, 222 A.3d at 483–84.
23. See id. (citing Nulman Park Found., 93 A.3d at 28; Cullen, 15 A.3d at
975, 980).
24. Id. at 483 (citing Cullen, 15 A.3d at 975).
25. Id. at 483–84.
26. Id. at 484 (citing Cullen, 15 A.3d at 975).
27. Id.
28. Id. (citing Nulman Park Found., 93 A.3d at 26–28).
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approval for their construction, they could rebuild their home in the
exact specifications even if the Court granted equitable relief.29
COMMENTARY

The Rhode Island Supreme Court displayed that their harsh
line on enforcing property servitudes is not without limit. The
equitable remedies in Cullen and Nulman were no less extreme
than the proposed relief here, but because the plaintiff would not
receive any benefit from the destruction of the Moore’s home other
than pure vindication, the Court determined that equitable relief
was inappropriate.30 At first glance, the result seems to leave the
plaintiff remediless even though the defendants clearly violated the
restrictive land covenant. The plaintiff was not protected by the
covenant in the way he may have anticipated when buying his
property. The plaintiff’s next-door neighbors were able to replace
an unobtrusive one-story house with a three-story structure
without affording the plaintiff the opportunity to object to the
construction before it was too late.31 However, the plaintiff’s lack
of remedy seems to reflect the plaintiff’s error rather than the
Court’s stance on enforcing restrictive land covenants. The Court
noted that it would not consider the plaintiff’s claim for damages
because he cited no support for his claim.32 The Court also declined
to consider adopting § 6.13 of the Restatement Third Property and
hold the committee accountable for breaching their duty of good
faith to the plaintiff because the plaintiff failed to name the
committee members in his complaint.33 Consequently, the Court
was left to consider a rather irrational request for equitable relief.
Therefore, the Court’s denial of any relief here does not appear to
reflect the Court’s opinion on the severity of violating restrictive
land covenants, but rather the plaintiff’s own errors in arguing and
requesting relief.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 483–84.
31. By the time the committee approved of the plans, the house had been
under construction for six months. Id. at 480. We can only speculate what
may have happened if the defendants had followed the proper protocols, but
perhaps the other neighbors would have been more responsive to the plaintiff’s
objections had the house not already been half-built.
32. Id. at 482 n.6.
33. See id. at 481 n.4.
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Despite considering two issues on appeal, the Court focused
the majority of its opinion on determining if equitable relief was
appropriate and devoted almost no time to explaining why the
language of the covenant required prior approval. The Court states,
without further explanation, “we agree with the plaintiff that . . .
the restrictive covenant provides that a landowner must obtain the
committee’s written approval prior to erecting a structure on a
lot.”34 And, although the language of the covenant does seem
rather clear, the covenant provides that “[n]o building or buildings
shall be erected . . . until construction plans . . . have been
approved,”35 the hearing justice determined that the language was
ambiguous enough to create a “fluid process where approval may be
gained in the middle of construction.”36 Consequently, it is unclear
why the Court disagreed with the hearing justice’s interpretation
of the land covenant because the Court determined that the request
for equitable relief here was so absurd that the defendants were
entitled to summary judgment anyway.
CONCLUSION

The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that enforcing the
Indian Avenue restrictive land covenant through equitable relief
was not appropriate because granting such relief would be futile.
Although the defendants violated the restrictive land covenant, if
the Court granted equitable relief and ordered the destruction of
the house, the defendants could simply rebuild the house
afterwards. Such an order would grant the plaintiff no real relief,
and the defendants would face substantial costs; therefore,
equitable relief was inappropriate.
Shannon Griffin

34. Id. at 482.
35. Id. at 480 (emphasis added).
36. Id. at 481.

